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Abstract:
Purpose: Along with mutual funds’ scale and quantity expanding, it is common for fund
management companies hiring new managers or the original fund managers mobilizing from
one to another. The high liquidity of  fund managers makes different managers regroup to
manage the funds that belong to the same fund management company in each fund year. The
characteristics of  these different management teams will influence the fund performance, and
also affect the earnings of  the fund management companies and portfolio investors. The
purposes of  this paper are as follows. First, evaluating the effect of  management team
characteristics on portfolio characteristics: risk, performance, and extremity. Second, testing the
hypothesis that the ranking of  mid-year performance have effect on investment style extremity
and researching what relationship exists between this phenomenon and management team
characteristics in depth.
Design/methodology/approach: On the analysis of  the relationships between the
management team characteristics and portfolio characteristics, a series of  OLS regressions were
run. The time series regression model (the factor model) and cross-sectional regression were
included based on using the STATA, EVIEWS and MATLAB. All of  the above were aimed at
achieving portfolio optimization and realizing the maximization of  the interests for fund
management companies and investors.
Findings: The main findings are as follows. Teams with more degrees(MBA, CPA and CFA)
held more risky portfolios, while teams with long team tenure held less. More members, large
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age diversity and long team tenure had positive effect on performance, and the opposite was
gender diversity. Teams with more members tend to hold less extreme style decisions, but
gender diversity and long tenure were related to more. Besides, tournament hypothesis did exist
in China investment funds industry especially when the economy was in a downward phase, and
fund managers were more likely to increase the risk of  portfolio when their term was coming to
an end. 
Research limitations/implications: The primary limitation in the scope is the sample. The
funds in our sample whose ages have to be more than one year, so the funds that can reach the
condition are not a lot. It may affect the accuracy of  the results on some degree.
Practical implications: These findings have important implications for fund management
companies as they try to form a highly efficient management team as well as for individual
investors’ investment allocation decisions.
Originality/value: This paper proposes a new perspective to evaluate the relationship between
the management team characteristics and portfolio characteristics. It focuses on the fund
management companies rather than a single fund. 
Keywords: financial engineering, mutual fund portfolios, management team characteristics, style
extremity, tournament hypothesis
1. Introduction
Mutual fund managers in the fund management companies frequently change along with
mutual funds’ scale and quantity expanding. It is common for fund management companies
hiring new managers or the original fund managers mobilizing from one to another. According
to the Chinese Fund Net, 48.01 percent of the fund managers have changed their jobs from
the year 2000 to 2010. The high liquidity of fund managers makes different managers regroup
to manage the funds that belong to the same fund management company in each fund year.
The characteristics of these different groups will influence the fund performance, and also
affect the earnings of the fund management companies. Numerous studies have investigated
the effect of managers characteristics on performance and risk-taking (Chevalier & Ellison,
1999; Indro, Jiang, Hu & Lee, 1999; Kon, 2000). Baer, Niessen and Ruenzi (2007) investigated
the impact of four measures of work group diversity on mutual fund performance. These
findings have important implications for fund management companies as they make decisions
regarding the composition of management teams as well as for individual investors structuring
their investment allocations. 
The fact that the funds are not only managed by a single manager but also a management
team which has more than one manager. This paper examines the structure of team-managed
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funds using hand collected data on 343 fund years for 57 fund management companies from
Jan 2003 to Dec 2012. Management team in this paper means all of the managers working in
the same company in each fund year. The data are used to construct several team-level
characteristics which are then related to measures of portfolio risk, risk-adjusted performance
and style extremity. Then, if the fund management companies’ performance is consistent with
the individual funds? Is it better to form new teams of managers for the fund management
companies? The answers to these questions have important investment implications. None of
the recent researches was aimed at the relationship of management team characteristics and
the performance of the fund management companies. This is the first question we are paying
attention to in this paper. Besides, there is no doubt that the mutual fund market is a
tournament in which all funds having comparable investment objectives compete with one
another. And the amount of remuneration which a fund receives for “winning” this tournament
depends on its performance relative to the other participants. Sirri and Tufano(1992)
substantiated that mutual funds earning the highest returns during an assessment period
receive the largest rewards in terms of increased new investments in the fund. Fund managers
who have good performance are called “winners”, and “losers” are the ones whose
performance are not good. Managers with either extremely good or bad relative returns at
mid-year have incentives to alter the investment characteristics of their portfolios, such as
improving or reducing their portfolios risk levels. To this end, our goal in this paper is to test
the hypothesis that the ranking of mid-year performance has effect on investment style
extremity, and what relationship exists in the phenomenon and management team
characteristics in depth. This is the second question in this paper. Both of the questions are
very important for the fund management companies when taking management measures and
allocating human resources reasonably. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents related literature. Section
3 describes the method, data sources, and variable definition. Section 4 presents the empirical
results; Section 5 tests the tournament hypothesis in fund management company; Section 6
provides conclusions.
2. Literature review 
Motivated by the increasingly important role of portfolio management teams, recent literatures
have focused on the team-managed funds. Several theoretical papers posited that team
management might be a superior structure in the presence (Sharpe, 1981) or even in the
absence (Barry & Starks, 1984) of specialization or diversification benefits. Han, Noe and
Rebello (2012) found a positive correlation between team management and fund performance.
Baer, Niessen and Ruenzi (2009) investigated the impact of work group diversity on
performance, finding that informational diversity has a positive impact on performance, which
is driven by tenure and educational diversity. Social category diversity had a negative impact
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on performance, and it was driven by gender diversity while age diversity had no strong
impact. In terms of portfolio risk and style, most studies pointed to the conclusion that single
manager takes on more risk, making more extreme decisions (Baer, Kempf & Ruenzi, 2011),
and adjusting their portfolioes more often in the face of risk considerations (Qiu, 2003).
Korniotis (2011) examined the investment decisions of older individual investors. It found that
older investors' portfolio decisions reflect greater knowledge about investing, but their
investment skill deteriorates with age due to the adverse effects of cognitive aging. Many other
research studies, especially in the management and psychology literature, have investigated
the decision-making process, behavior, and performance of teams. The results differ across
studies mainly due to the variety of tasks and measures used in each study, which makes it
difficult to know what characteristics of management team is superior.
All teams, however, are not the same. Team size and team diversity are the most frequently
studied team characteristics with mixed results. Larger and more diverse teams may have a
broader range of skill and knowledge. But in the opposite, they may not be able to exploit
those advantages since some members may not be motivated to contribute, or the diversity of
team members’ views can sometimes be so broad that they are difficult to reconcile
(Herrenkohl, 2004; Hill, 1982). The type of diversity also seems to be of some import. For
instance, Simons, Pelled and Smith (1999) found that job related forms of diversity
(background, education, and tenure) have a positive effect, while others (age) do not. In
terms of risk, common sense would suggest that teams are prone to taking less risk and that
risk would be even less for teams with more members. However, Herrenkohl (2004), Janis
(1982) and other researchers have suggested that teams are subject to the risky shift
phenomenon. Iordanis Karagiannidis (2012) investigated the effect of management team-level
characteristics on portfolio risk and style extremity using a unique dataset of 1678 mutual fund
managers. Results showed that teams with more members, longer tenure, and more members
with graduate business training hold less risky portfolios. When people are in groups, they
make decisions about risk differently than when they are alone. Member diversity is related to
less extreme style decisions. And different levels of portfolio risk have great effect on the
performance. How portfolio managers adapt their investment behavior to the economic
incentives they are provided? Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) studied the 334 growth funds
from 1976 to 1991, finding that the tournament hypothesis in performance does exist by
ranking the mid-year returns from highest to lowest. And then the volatility of monthly returns
are attached according to the fund’s ranking. Koski and Pontiff (1999) maked regression
analysis of 798 equity funds from 1992 to 1994 and also found the existence of performance
competition. Meanwhile, some researchers have found the tournament hypothesis is not
significant in statistical (Busse, 2001; Goriaev, Nijman & Werker, 2005). Malmendier and Nagel
(2010) focused on the effect of individual experiences of macroeconomic shocks on financial
risk taking using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances from 1960 to 2007. They found
that individuals who have experienced low stock market returns report lower willingness to
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take financial risk, are less likely to participate in the stock market, and are more pessimistic
about future stock returns. Those who have experienced low bond returns are less likely to
own bonds. And more recent return experiences have stronger effects, particularly on younger
people. All of the studies were aimed at a single fund, but none of them was related to the
performance of the fund management companies. Does this phenomenon exist in management
companies? What management team characteristics are related to this? The answers to these
questions have important investment implications. 
Ultimately, it is an empirical question whether the different management team characteristics
have impact on fund management company's performance. Using the sample of 57 mutual
fund management companies in 343 fund years, this study relates team size, tenure, the
percentages of other degrees (MBA, CFA etc.) and several measures of diversity (age, gender
and tenure) to portfolio risk and performance. 
3. Method and data 
The analysis was as follows. First, manager characteristics were obtained for all funds at the
beginning of each year t for all years in our sample period (2003-2011). Those management
team characteristics were then used to create team-level variables for all funds of 57 fund
management companies to measures of risk, risk-adjusted performance over the course of the
next year (2004-2012). Considering these characteristics affect the performance of the fund
will not immediately appear, s o our research studies the influence of the fund management
team characteristics in a certain period on its next fund year performance (t+1). Ordinary least
square (OLS) regressions were employed, and clustered standard errors were estimated by
fund. 
3.1. Mutual fund data
All of the mutual fund datas in this report come from the CSMAR Database and the index datas
are from the Wind Database. The CSMAR Database contains lots of information about
managers and daily fund returns for all funds in operation every year from 2003 to 2012.
Datas are gathered for all domestic equity funds with a self-declared investment objective of
growth, aggressive growth, growth income, or equity income. Excluded are index funds,
balanced funds, funds of funds, as well as other types of funds that are restricted in some
sense in their investment decisions. Obtained for each fund were daily returns, annual expense
ratios, accumulative total net values, total net assets, fund inception dates, fund management
company’s name, portfolio characteristics, such as total number of open mode fund, as well as
characteristics of managers (age, gender, tenure, MBA and so on). Besides, the database lists
the name of the managers and the date when they begin to manage the fund until they
disappear from the database. So we can conclude their tenure and the term “management
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team” when more than two people are involved in the management of the funds and they
manage together.
From the advanced analytics view of the database, it is easy to know how many fund
managers compose the management team. The data of the characteristics with each team at
this time of the fund management company in each fund year were hand collected. Each fund's
management fees were hand collected. Such as management fees in the database are taken
from the fund prospectus. Finally, included are the objective and year dummy variables, as
well as several other control variables, in all regressions even though their coefficients are not
reported. Following Baer et al. (2007), age and gender diversity are used as proxies for social
category diversity. Tenure diversity serve as measures of informational diversity. Also
investigated in this study is the effect of other variables that have proven to be important in
studies which focus on individual manager characteristics, such as team tenure.
3.2. Manager data and team-level variables
The CSMAR database contains a brief biographical sketch for each fund manager. The
information was hand collect about all of the portfolio managers who are members of a
portfolio management team in our fund year. For each manager, data were collected on the
starting date at the fund, gender, undergraduate and graduate institutions attended, degrees
received (including the year in which the degrees were conveyed), the name of the
management company for which they work, and the funds they manage. According to our
analysis, we can know who works in the company in each fund year. Then, using the
information collected from the biographical sketches, additional variables were constructed for
every manager in our sample. More specifically, the following variables were constructed for
each individual manager:
1. Manager age: The manager's age was calculated by starting with the manager's
undergraduate graduation date and assuming that the manager was 23 years old at the
time of undergraduate course graduation, 26 years old of master degree and 29 years
old of doctor graduation.
2. More degrees: This variable was constructed that takes a value of one if the manager
has an MBA, CFA or CPA etc, and zero otherwise.
3. Manager Tenure: A manager's tenure with the fund was estimated by subtracting the
date the manager started at the fund from the date for which we wish to measure
tenure.
4. Gender: A gender dummy was created that takes a value of one if the manager is male
and a value of zero if the manager is female.
Using the manager characteristics data mentioned above for managers who work in teams, the
following team-level variables were created:
-299-
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management – http://dx.doi.org/10.3926/jiem.987
1. Team Size: Team size was measured as the number of managers in the team.
2. Gender Diversity: For each of these variables, a team member can belong to one of two
categories (male or female). Following Baer et al. (2007) entropy-based index as a
measure of diversity was used.
Diversity=∑
i
−pi × ln(pi) (1)
where i can be zero or one and pi is the proportion of the team members belonging to
that category. For men only or women only teams the measure is set equal to zero.
3. Age Diversity and Tenure Diversity: To capture age and tenure diversity, the coefficient
of variation for the team members’ ages and tenure were calculated, respectively.
4. More degrees (%): Both of these variables were calculated as the percent of managers
in the team that have an MBA, CFA and CPA degree.
5. Team Tenure: The team tenure variable was defined as the time (in years) managers
have been working together as a team. For teams whose managers joined the fund at
different dates, team tenure was calculated from the time since the latest team
member was added to the team.
Summary statistics for the team-level variables in this sample appear in Table 1. The
management team has 3.88 members and has a team tenure of 1.62 years in mean. Most of
the managers that are members of the team (25%) have more degrees. 
Variable N Mean Std dev Min Max
Team Size 343 3.88 2.13 2 15
Age Diversity 343 0.079 0.06 0 0.475
Gender Diversity 343 0.184 0.27 0 0.69
Tenure Diversity 343 0.284 0.187 0 0.94
More Degrees (%) 343 0.25 0.256 0 1
Team Tenure 343 1.62 0.73 0.67 4.5
Table 1. Summary statistics of team-level variables
Team
Size
Age
Diversity
Gender
Diversity
Tenure
Diversity
More
Degr(%)
Team
Tenure
Team Size 1
Age Diversity 0.18 1
Gender Diversity 0.19 0.17 1
Tenure Diversity 0.19 0.61 0.17 1
More Degrees 0.08 0.001 0.20 -0.03 1
Team Tenure 0.09 0.07 -0.03 0.06 -0.11 1
Table 2. Correlation matrix of team-level variables
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Table 2 reports all the correlation coefficients among the team-level variables. All of the other
correlation coefficients are relatively low, indicating that our team-level variables are not highly
correlated, with the exception of the coefficient between Age Diversity and Tenure Diversity
(0.61).
3.3. Portfolio risk and risk-adjusted performance measures
To evaluate the riskiness of the portfolio, the standard deviation of daily returns (total risk) and
the market beta from the market model (systematic risk) were used. These data were derived
from the following time-series regression model that was also employed to obtain Jensen's
(1968) alpha:
Rit−Rft =α i+β i1EMRt+ε it (2)
where Rit – Rft is the day-t excess gross return for a fund management company i (i = 1, … 57)
in each fund year, and Rit is the average returns of its funds. For a fund management company
i in year t, and it has n types of funds.
N
R
R
N
n
tn
ti

 1
,
,
(3)
Rn , t = Ln(NAV t) − Ln(NAV t−1) (4)
NAVt is the day-t accumulated earnings. EMRt is the excess market return, where it equals to
Rmt – Rft, and Rmt is the market return. 
Rmt =0.8∗R816999.CV+0.2R816020.CI (5)
And the one-day bank deposit interest rates are used as the risk-free rate in calculating ecxess
market returns.
The style extremity measure, following Baer et al. (2009), was used as the extent to which the
fund's factor loadings, on a Fama and French (1993) three factor model, deviate from the
average factor loadings on funds in the same investment objective. First, the following
regression was estimated:
Rit−Rft =α i+β i1EMRt+β i2SMBt+β i3HMLt+ε it (6)
Where SMBt is the difference in returns across small-cap and large-cap stock portfolios, HMLt
is the difference in returns between high and low book-to-market portfolios. 
Then, three style extremity measures were conducted for each fund management company i
and year t, as the absolute difference in the fund's factor loading, βit, and the corresponding
objective average factor loading, βit. This style benchmark is the average factor loading of all
funds in the same prospectus objective and year. Similar to Baer et al. (2009), this number is
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divided by the average absolute style difference in the corresponding prospectus objective to
normalize it. More formally:
SE it
F=∣β i,t
F −β i ,t
F ∣norm (7)
where F indicates the style dimension (SMB or HML). By construction, the average style
extremity is one. The greater the style extremity measure, the more extreme the fund's
investment style. 
Finally, to measure risk adjusted performance, the sharper ratio is used, as well as the one-
factor and three-factor alpha from Equations (2) and (6) above.
4. Models and results 
In order to evaluate the effect of management team characteristics on portfolio risk and
performance, a series of OLS regressions were run where the dependent variables are
standard deviation or returns, market beta, sharpe ratio, one-factor and three-factor alphas
and style extremity measures. Team-level variables, along with a set of control variables, are
included above. Specifically:
Dependent i , t =α +β 1Teamsizei , t−1β 2 AgeDiv i , t−1 + β 3GenderDiv i , t−1 + β 4 TernureDiv i , t−1
+ β 5 MoreDegree i ,t−1 + β 6TeamTernurei , t−1 + β 7 X t + ε t
(8)
where all of the variables are as defined above. Also included are the following control
variables [represented by Xt in Equation (8)] that could affect the actions, risk, and
performance of mutual funds: MgtFee is the management fee charged by the management
company. LogAssets is a measure of fund size and is calculated by taking the log of the
average of the fund's assets at the beginning and end of year t, and the age is also on
average. 
The results presented in Table 3 indicate that in terms of systematic risk (market beta), teams
with more members hold less risky portfolios, which is significant at the 10% level.
Management team members with more degrees hold more risky portfolios, and long tenure
teams hold less. And both of them are significant when standard deviation of returns is in the
measure of risk. One possible explanation could be that the managers with other degrees will
be more confident and they prefer more risk which can bring higher returns. When making
investment decisions, long cooperation makes them easily come to agreement in face of
different opinions. It’s worth noting that * denotes significant at 10%, ** at 5%, and *** at
1% in the following tables.
Table 4, shows that team size, age diversity and team tenure are very important team-level
characteristics related to performance. The coefficient of them are positive when sharpe ratio
and the three-factor alpha are the measures of portfolio performance. Teams with large gender
diversity often exhibit worse performance at the measure of Jensen' s alpha (p-value<0.01)
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and the three-factor alpha (p-value<0.1). Teams with more members will obtain better
performance. If the managers in a team with all ages, the older ones can provide rich
experience, and the young have more passion and energy when they are working. It is
conducive to improve performance. 
Total Risk Market Risk
Team Size -0.045193(0.48)
-0.00401*
(0.08)
Age Diversity 0.031526(0.57)
-0.123341
(0.13)
Gender Diversity -0.222058(0.64)
-0.28368
(0.98)
Tenure Diversity -0.047869(0.86)
0.055432
(0.49)
More Degrees（%） 0.281777
*
(0.09)
0.023937**
(0.02)
Team Tenure -0.081934
**
(0.02)
-0.060043*
(0.07)
R-squared 0.502386 0.199884
Table 3. Portfolio risk
Sharpe ratio Jensen's alpha 3-factor alpha
Team Size 0.018329
***
(0.01)
1.717135*
(0.08)
0.003854
(0.68)
Age Diversity 0.781909
**
(0.04)
0.22637
(0.94)
3.015203**
(0.03)
Gender Diversity -0.389426(0.57)
-0.830924***
(0.00)
-1.161037*
(0.07)
Tenure Diversity 0.068743(0.89)
0.240595*
(0.06)
0.078525
(0.35)
More Degrees(%) 0.632568(0.38)
-1.368977
(0.96)
-0.437385
(0.77)
Team Tenure 0.019751
*
(0.10)
0.056635
(0.62)
0.155497**
(0.02)
R-squared 0.672386 0.254720 0.199125
Table 4. Risk-adjusted performance
The findings on style extremity are reported in table 5. Chan, Chen and Lakonishok (2002) has
found that the SMB and HML are two important style choices. When the style extremity is
measured by SMB or HML, both of the two indicators show that the more management teams
members, the more tendency to steady investment. It can be explained that fund managers in
a large team will be easier to influence and restrict each other in the process o f decision-
making. Though there are large difference between their own investment styles, they can be
weakened and balanced by managing the same funds together. They will be inclined to avoid
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more aggressive investment styles. Large gender diversity and long team tenure bring more
extreme investment styles when is measured by SMB and HML (p-value<0.05), respectively. 
SMB HML
Team Size -0.18
**
(0.01)
0.55**
(0.02)
Age Diversity -0.0954(0.81)
0.2382
(0.38)
Gender Diversity 0.0648
**
(0.04)
-0.08736
(0.54)
Tenure Diversity 0.02854(0.58)
-0.01957
(0.67)
More Degrees(%) -0.027880(0.36)
-0.014265
(0.78)
Team Tenure 0.006634(0.79)
-0.048060**
(0.05)
R-squared 0.284736 0.211659
Table 5. Style extremity
5.The test of tournament hypothesis 
The stock market fell in 2008 because of the financial crisis, but in 2007 comes a time when
the economic i s prosperity. So this article chooses these two years as a representative, in
order to investigate the performance competition behavior of fund management companies in
China.
5.1. The hypothesis and data
Tournament Hypothesis: Those managers who have high interim returns compared to their
peers will want to maintain the high returns. They will be less inclined to take risky positions
and may even consider scaling back their risk positions in an attempt to “lock in” their present
return level. Unfortunately, to the extent that they anticipate what those managers ranked
below them might do, it may be necessary for them to increase risk as well. After eliminating
the fund companies whose yield of published were within a full year, we can get 37 companies
in 2007 and 48 in 2008.
According to the Brown et al. (1996) and Busse (2001), the yield of accumulative total net
values are ranked and the median value size is their divisions. The companies whose yield are
located above the median are the interim winners and the below ones are the interim losers.
Representing the interim winner and loser strategies by the subscripts W and L, respectively,
and the corresponding portfolio risk levels in the first and second subperiods by σ1 and σ2,
these reasons lead to our central prediction:
σ 2L
σ 1L
>
σ 2W
σ 1W (9)
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The investors determine their investment behavior considering the end of the fund
management company performance ranking. The first six months in each year is as the
evaluation period and the next six months is the adjustment period. In the first period, we
rank the fund management company's performance by CRm (M-month cumulative return). The
method is as follows: the Rit is the average returns in each day, so the Rm is the average returns
in each month:
Rm=∏
t=1
n
(1+R it)−1 (10)
And n is the trading days of each month. For the average monthly returns, we can get the total
yield in the first half year. If m=6, the six month cumulative return as follows:
CRm=∏
t=1
6
(1+Rm,t)−1 (11)
Then we need to test the hypothesis that winners and losers make different adjustments to the
investment characteristics of their portfolios is a ratio of each fund’s volatility measured before
and after the interim assessment period. With the interim assessment date at month m, the
fund risk adjustment ratio, RAR (risk adjustment ratio), for a particular year is calculated as:
RARm= √ 15∑t=7
12
(Rm,t−Rm2)
2
1
5∑t=1
6
(Rm ,t−Rm1)
2
(12)
The Rm1  and Rm2  are the fund management company’s average monthly income in evaluation
and adjustment period, respectively. Now we can create a (CR, RAR) pair for every fund with
the above definitions. The basic test procedure is then to generate a 2  2 contingency table in
which each pairing is placed into one of four cells: high CR (the winner) / high RAR; low CR (the
loser) / high RAR; high CR (the winner) / low RAR; low CR (the loser) / low RAR. As with the
earlier use of CR to define interim winners and losers, high and low levels of RAR are
determined as being above and below the median RAR value, respectively, for a given
tournament. In our tests, if the number of low CR (the loser) / high RAR is significantly more
than the number of high CR (the winner) / high RAR, we can accept the tournament
hypothesis; otherwise, we refuse it. The selection criteria of the research object in this section is
consistent with section 3 above. The sample period is from Jan1, 2007 to Dec31, 2008, and the
datas are from the CSMAR database. We rank the fund performance in June30, 2007 and
June30, 2008.
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5.2. The empirical results
In table 6, 29.73% of the interim losers increase portfolio risk and the ratio of decreasing
portfolio risk is 18.92%. Accordingly, the winners increase or decrease portfolio risk at a ratio
of 21.62%, 29.73%. The fund managers who were classified as relative losers during an
interim performance assessment period increase portfolio risk to a greater degree than do
interim winners indeed. The same condition is in 2008. 
Year Number ofFunds
Sample Frequency
Interim Losers Interim Winners
Low RAR High RAR Low RAR High RAR
2007 37 18.92% 29.73% 29.73% 21.62%
2008 48 18.75% 31.25% 31.25% 18.75%
Table 6. Descriptive statistics of CR and RAR in 2007 and 2008
Year
Interim Losers Interim Winners
T-value P-value
RAR (mean) RAR (mean)
2007 1.3483 1.1937 1.6301 0.1118
2008 1.1614 0.9976 1.7158 0.0937*
Table 7. T-test statistics of interim losers and winners
The interim losers increase portfolio risk to promote their ranking, especially in 2008. In 2007,
the frequencies of low CR / high RAR and high CR / high RAR cells are 29.73%, 21.62% and
they are 31.25%, 18.75% in 2008, respectively. The tournament phenomenon is evident in
2008, and it may be related to the financial crisis to some extent. As the stock price falls, more
fund managers tend to increase the portfolio risk, in an effort to obtain higher returns and
reverse the situation when the economic rises.
For RAR, it is different between the losers and the winners. In 2008, the t value is 1.7158,
which is significant at 10%. The risk adjustment ratio is obviously greater for the losers than
the winners. By the table 6, 7 for those managers who have performed poorly, what they can
do is t o increase their relative risk level and only in this way can they have a chance to
improve their ranking by year end. But for those who have high interim returns compared to
their peers will want to maintain those high returns and consider scaling back their risk
positions in an attempt to “lock in” their present return level. It's worth noting that the winners
do not decrease risk to the same extent as the losers increase risk significantly.
Thus, we speculat that if there is some relationships between the portfolio risk adjustment
behavior and the manager’s remaining tenure? According to the fund manager's resume, we
can calculate the length of time from now to their maturity dates, which is the average
remaining tenure of all managers in the management team. We calculate two separate
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classifications: funds whose fund manager’s remaining tenure are above the median value of
average remaining tenure and whose are below.
Year Remaining Tenure Number ofFunds
Sample Frequency
Interim Losers Interim Winners
Low RAR High RAR Low RAR High RAR
2007
Below the Median
Value（1.75year） 20 20% 45% 25% 10%
Above the Median
Value（1.75year） 17 17.65% 11.76% 52.94% 17.65%
2008
Below the Median
Value（1.88year） 19 31.58% 15.79% 31.58% 21.05%
Above the Median
Value（1.88year） 29 10.34% 41.39% 31.03% 17.24%
Table 8. Frequency distributions of CR and RAR
In table 8, more interim winners choose to lower the risk of fund portfolios than increasing it in
2007, 2008. That’s because the winners are more satisfied with the current status, and they
do not need to change it. But for the interim losers in 2007, the shorter the remaining tenure,
the higher risk they increase. Otherwise, the opposite. This phenomenon is largely due to the
upturn of the economic in 2007. The fund managers whose tenure is coming over are not too
care about being dismissed because of a huge loss for the company. So they hope to struggle
and strive for generating a return which is sufficient to improving their ranking by year end
with the help of the good economic situation at present. For those who still have a long tenure,
they will reconsider their decisions and not easily take risks. But in 2008, the situation for
interim losers is on the contrary: the shorter the tenure remaining, the lower risk they
increase. Managers with a longer tenure increase the risk. The financial crisis in 2008
undoubtedly have great influence on fund manager’s behavior. It is no surprising that the fund
managers do not have incentive to fight for the good income in the future when the economic
situation was in a recession, combining with that their tenure are coming to an end. But for the
fund managers who still have long tenure, they will work hard for the good future job
performance. Low-ranking performance and bad economic situation make them to produce the
idea of "the man have nothing fears nobody ". So they will attempt to achieve good results by
altering fund risk during the rest of the tenure.
Year
Long Remaining Tenure Short Remaining Tenure
T-value P-value
Mean RAR Mean RAR
2007 1.3794 1.3856 2.52 0.0100***
2008 1.0334 1.3157 2.0362 0.0492**
Table 9. T-test Statistics of RAR
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Although the fund manager’s remaining tenure and risk adjustment ratio are related to the
economic situation as well as the preliminary performance ranking, the fund managers who will
soon be leaving are more inclined to increase the risk no matter the economic is good or bad.
6. Conclusions and implications
This study mainly focuses on two major issues. Firstly, the effect of management team
characteristics on portfolio returns, risk-taking and style extremity of mutual fund portfolios;
Secondly, tournament hypothesis in fund management companies and the relationships
between the manager’s risking-taking behavior and their remaining tenure. We draw the
following conclusions: 
• Teams with more degrees (MBA, CPA and CFA) hold more risky portfolios, while teams
with long team tenure hold less.
• More members, large age diversity and long team tenure have positive effect on
performance, and the opposite is gender diversity.
• More members makes their investment style tend to be less extreme. Teams with large
gender diversity and long team tenure prefer more extreme styles.
• Tournament hypothesis does exist in China investment funds industry especially when
the economy is in a downward phase. In this period, the fund managers will be more
urgent to change the bad status. Although the fund manager’s remaining tenure and
risk adjustment ratio will be related to the economic situation as well as the preliminary
performance ranking, for fund managers who will soon be leaving are more inclined to
increase the risk no matter the economic is good or not. 
In general, this study provides new insights regarding the performances of the fund
management companies. Results should have important implications for the companies as they
make decisions about the composition of management teams as well as for individual investors
who examine their investment allocations.
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